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Oparil: Corporate Officers and Employees

PROCURING TRIAL TESTIMONY FROM CORPORATE
OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES: ALTERNATIVE
METHODS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
by

RICHARD J. OPARIL"
One of the most vexing questions facing civil litigators is how to compel the

presence of officers of a corporate party at trial who may not be subject to the
subpoena power of the federal court. "[S]ubpoenas requiring the attendance of
witnesses at trial cannot be served outside the judicial district more than 100

miles from the place of trial."1 For example, a corporate plaintiff files an action
against a corporate defendant in the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia. Venue is proper, even though the defendant's headquarters are
located in Los Angeles.2 Surprisingly, it is an unresolved question whether the

plaintiff may compel the presence of the corporate defendant's officers to testify
at trial in D.C. 3 The case law on this issue is relatively sparse and inconclusive,
and the commentators are largely silent.4
This article discusses the situation under the current Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure,5 including some alternative methods of obtaining testimony at trial.

The article then discusses various ways the problem could be solved through rule
changes to help ensure live trial testimony by corporate officials.

* B.A., Syracuse University 1981; J.D., Case Western Reserve University School of Law 1985. The
author is a member of the New York and District of Columbia bars and practices law in Washington, D.C.
with Schwalb, Donnenfield, Bray & Silbert He would like to express his appreciation to Donna M.
DeSilva.
' Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227, 231 (1964). The rule is intended "not only to protect
witnesses from the harassment of long, tiresome trips but also, in line with our national policy, to
minimize the costs of litigation, which policy is strongly emphasized in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure." Id. at 234.
2 "[A] corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal
jurisdiction...." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1988).
3 See FED. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(3)(A)(ii) and FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(3)(B)(iii), quoted at accompanying notes
12 and 13.

New York is one state that provides for statewide service of process, thereby extending the 100-mile
limit See N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L.& R. §§ 308,2303 (McKinney's 1991). Certain federal statutes broaden
a federal court's subpoena power in civil cases. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 23 (1982).
4 See 5A MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 45.09 (1991). Cf.Bucklo, Can a Party Be Required to Attend
Trial?, 14 LITnGATION 33, 34 (Spring 1988).

' See infra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
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THE PRESENT SITUATION

Rule 45
The current design of the Federal Rules provides for broad and nationwide
discovery, while curiously limiting, essentially through geographic location, the
ability of parties and the court to require attendance and live testimony at trial.
The 100-mile limit in Rule 45 can be traced to the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789,
passed by the First Congress.6 Section 30 of that Act provided in part:
[W]hen the testimony of any person shall be necessary in any civil
cause pending in any district in any court of the United States, who shall
live at a greater distance from the place of trial than one hundred miles,
or is bound on a voyage to sea, or is about to go out of the United States,
or out of such district, and to a greater distance from the place of trial
than as aforesaid, before the time of trial, or is ancient or very infirm, the
deposition of such person may be taken de bene esse before any justice
or judge of any of the courts of the United States....
Congress later added a 100-mile limit for subpoenas out of a judicial district:
[S]ubpoenas for witnesses who may be required to attend a court of
the United States, in any district thereof, may run into another district:
Provided, [t]hat in civil causes, the witnesses living out of the district in
which the court is holden, do not live at a greater distance than one
hundred miles from the place of holding the same.'
Under the current scheme, a witness must be personally served with the subpoena
within the geographic limitations of the Federal Rules whether he or she is the
employee of a party or a nonparty. If not, the subpoena is invalid.9
On April 30, 1991, the Supreme Court transmitted to Congress certain
changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including a revised version of
6 For a general discussion of the historical background of the geographic limitation on the subpoena
power, see Wasserman, The Subpoena Power: Pennoyer's Last Vestige, 74 MINN. L REv. 37 (1989).
7 Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 30, 1 Stat 73, 88 (1789).
8 Judiciary Act, ch. 22, § 6, 1 Stat. 333, 335 (1793).
9See, e.g., Blum v. Housewright, 113 F.R.D. 676 (D. Nev. 1987) (witness who lived outside the district
and more than 100 miles from the courthouse was not subject to subpoena in a civil action); Lyles v.
Beta, 32 F.R.D. 248 (S.D. Tex. 1963) (motion for subpoena denied where individuals did not reside
within 100 miles of the place of hearing or trial); 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE (CIVIL) § 2459 (1971) (subpoena in a civil action may be served within the district or 100
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol25/iss3/3
2
miles from the place of hearing or trial).

Oparil: Corporate Officers and Employees
Winter/Spring, 19921

CORPORATE Op-FcmEs AND EMPLoYEES

Rule 45."° The new rules took effect December 1, 1991. Those revisions do not
directly address the problem of obtaining subpoena power over officers of a
corporate party who are outside of the judicial district. However, the new Rule
45(b)(2) provides in part:
Subject to the provisions of clause (ii) of subparagraph (c)(3)(A) of this
rule, a subpoena may be served at any place within the district of the
court by which it is issued, or at any place without the district that is
within 100 miles of the place of the deposition, hearing, trial, production,
or inspection specified in the subpoena or at any place within the state
where a state statute or rule of court permits service of a subpoena issued
by a state court of general jurisdiction sitting in the place of the
deposition, hearing, trial, production, or inspection specified in the
subpoena. When a statute of the United States provides therefor, the
court upon proper application and cause shown may authorize the service
of a subpoena at any other place."
New Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii) provides that a court may quash or modify a
subpoena it issued if the subpoena:
requires a person who is not a party or an officer of a party to travel to
a place more than 100 miles from the place where that person resides, is
employed or regularly transacts business in person, except that, subject
to the provisions of clause (c)(3)(B)(iii) of this rule, such a person may
in order to attend trial be commanded to travel from any such12 place
within the state in which the trial is held.... (Emphasis added.)

'0 111 S. Ct. 945, 945-63 (1991).

"FED. R. Cirv. P. 45(b)(2). Prior to December 1, 1991, FED. R. CIrv. P. 45(e)(1) provided that:
A subpoena requiring the attendance of a witness at a hearing or trial may be served at any
place within the district, or at any place without the district that is within 100 miles of the
place of the hearing or trial specified in the subpoena, or at a place within the state where a
state statute or rule of court permits service of a subpoena issued by a state court of general
jurisdiction sitting in the place where the district court is held. When a statute of the United
States provides therefor, the court upon proper application and cause shown may authorize the
service of a subpoena at any other place.
FED. R. Civ. P. 45(e)(1). The Advisory Committee Note to the 1980 Amendment noted that:
The amendment makes the reach of a subpoena of a district court at least as extensive as that
of the state courts of general jurisdiction in the state in which the district court is held....
No reason appears why it should be less, as it sometimes is because of the accident of district
lines. Restrictions upon the reach of subpoenas are imposed to prevent undue inconvenience
to witnesses. State statutes and rules of court are quite likely to reflect the varying degrees of
difficulty and expense attendant upon local travel.
FED. R. Civ. P. 45(e)(1) (1980) (Advisory Committee Note).
12 FED. R.
P. 45(cX3)(A)(ii). 1992
Published
byCIv.
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Finally, new Rule 45(c)(3)(B)(iii) states that if a subpoena:
requires a person who is not a party or an officer of a party to incur
substantial expense to travel more than 100 miles to attend trial, the court
may, to protect a person subject to or affected by the subpoena, quash or
modify the subpoena or, if the party in whose behalf the subpoena is
issued shows a substantial need for the testimony or material that cannot
be otherwise met without undue hardship and assures that the person to
whom the subpoena is addressed will be reasonably compensated, the
court may order appearance
or production only upon specified conditions.
3
(Emphasis added.)1
These rule changes essentially left the geographic limitations on trial
subpoenas intact.
Trial Subpoenas for CorporateEmployees
The 100-mile test becomes more complicated when a party to litigation seeks
to compel the testimony of its opponent's employee at trial. One early circuit
court case wrote:
We know of no legal duty imposed upon a corporation to produce its
officer as a witness when the process of the court cannot reach him....
We know of no legal duty imposed upon an officer of a corporation to
appear as a witness against that corporation, except in obedience to the
writ of subpoena of a court duly served upon him. We know of no
power in the corporation or any duty devolving upon it, to compel its
officer to appear as a witness before a court. We know of no right in a
court to compel a corporation to produce its officer as an adverse witness.
The law furnishes ample machinery to procure the testimony of any
witness, in the service of its writ and by proceedings for contempt for
disobedience of the writ, or, if the witness is beyond the jurisdiction of
the court, by deposition or upon commission. 4
Another court wrote that a "defendant cannot be required to produce its employee
as a witness.... There is no authority to require the witness' attendance save
through subpoena.' 5 The following cases illustrate the application of this
notion.

"FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(3)(B)(iii).
14 Cent Grain & Stock Exch. v. Bd. of Trade, 125 F. 463, 468 (7th Cir. 1903).

s Czuprynski v. Shenango Furnace Co., 2 F.R.D. 412, 412-13 (W.D.N.Y. 1942); see also Los Angeles
Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. Nat'l Football League, 89 F.R.D. 497, 501 (C.D. Cal. 1981) ("Witnesses
may not be compelled to attend trial unless they can be served with subpoenas within the trial district,

or at any place outside of the district that is within 100 miles of the place of trial. FED. R. CIv. P.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol25/iss3/3
45(e).").
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Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Foster Wheeler Corp.6 involved a patent
interference proceeding pending before the Patent Office. Babcock & Wilcox
moved the court for an order requiring the co-inventor of the disputed patent
application to appear and give testimony. Babcock & Wilcox had been unable
to serve the inventor with a subpoena1 7 and Foster & Wheeler refused to
voluntarily produce the witness.'" The motion compelling attendance and
testimony was denied. 9 The court reasoned that:
Nowhere . . . do the Federal Rules authorize the district court to
command the presence of a witness at a hearing or trial without his
first being served with a valid subpoena .... There is no provision
in Rule 45 or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally for
ordering the attendance of a witness who by ingenious or ingenuous
tactics manages to avoid the subpoena server... . [A]ttendance of
reluctant, non-party witnesses at deposition or trial is wholly dependent
upon subpoena power.... Because the subpoena power of the Court
has not been called into play the Court is entirely without jurisdiction
to order whatever sanction might be appropriate had [the co-inventor]
been validly served with a subpoena....
In Jaynes v. Jaynes,21 the district court dismissed the pro se civil rights case
based on improper venue. However, in affirming, the Second Circuit found that
even if venue was proper, there was not service of process necessary to acquire
personal jurisdiction. Moreover, the district court could not have used its
subpoena power to compel the more than 30 defendants to appear. "[Tihis is a
civil case in which appellant seeks to have the district court subpoena parties who
reside in Texas or other parts of the country more than 100 miles from any place
within the Northern District of New York for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction
over them. The district court has no power to subpoena these parties....,22
In Merchant Bank of New York v. Grove Silk Co.,23 the defendant served
a subpoena on a vice president of the plaintiff-bank. The trial would take place
in Scranton, Pennsylvania, but the subpoena was served in New York City -- a
distance exceeding 100 miles. The court quashed the subpoena.U
'6174 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 145 (D.N.L 1972).
17

35 U.S.C. § 24 (1988) provides that the district court clerks shall issue a subpoena for any witness

residing or being in that district, in connection with a contested proceeding before the Patent Office. The
provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply regarding the attendance of witnesses.

" Babcock & Wilcox, 174 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 147-48.
'9Id. at 149.
2*Id. at 150 (footnotes omitted).
21 496 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1974).
22 Id. at 10.
23 11 F.R.D. 439 (M.D. Pa. 1951).

Published
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It is clear that a court cannot compel an individual who is beyond the court's
Rule 45 subpoena power to testify at trial as an individual. But can the argument
be made that the court has power to compel the corporation to testify at trial
through such an individual? A party does have a right to call an adverse party
as a witness in a civil trial.25 But where that adverse party is a corporation, it
can testify only through its personnel. The real problem occurs when specific
individuals are not within the subpoena power of the federal district court where
the trial is to occur.
"A corporation, as an artificial entity, must be called to testify through its
representatives. ' 26 Rule 611(c) of the Federal Rules of Evidence incorporated
the provisions of former Fed. R. Civ. P. 43(b) (abrogated in 1972) which stated
that "[a] party may call an adverse party or an officer, director, or managing agent
.
of a public or private corporation ... which is an adverse party ...
Although the language of former civil Rule 43(b) and evidence Rule 61 l(c) differ,
Rule 611(c) was intended at least to allow a party to call those witnesses who
could be called under former Rule 43(b). 28 Where discovery has established
which officers, directors, or managing agents of a corporation have knowledge of
the relevant facts, the corporation should be required to testify at trial as an
adverse party through those particular individuals. That the relevant officials of
the corporate defendant happen to be located outside the court's jurisdiction
should not interfere with a party's right to call the adverse party corporation as
a trial witness, because the forum court has power to compel the party to testify
through its relevant officials. The argument does not turn on whether the court
has power to subpoena individuals from outside its jurisdiction to testify as
individuals but, rather, that the court has power to compel the corporateparty to
testify through particular officers, directors, and managing agents, by means of
a subpoena served on the corporation to testify through the designated officials.29
While logical and persuasive, most courts have not adopted this argument

5See, e.g., Degelos v. Fidelity and Cas. Co. of N.Y., 313 F.2d 809, 814-15 (5th Cir. 1963) (former Rule
43(b) granted the right to call an adverse party as a witness); Mathews v. Hines, 444 F. Supp. 1201, 1208
(M.D. Fla. 1978); F. LANE, LANE'S GOLDSTEIN TRIAL TECHNIQUE § 11.82 (3d ed. 1986); C. WRIGHT &
A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (CIVIL) § 2413. at 368-70 (1971).
2' F. LANE, supra note 25.
27
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 25, at 306.
2S See 10 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 611.05[6]-[9] (2d ed. 1988).
29 The MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION notes that:
Special problems may arise when counsel attempt to call adverse parties or their
employees as witnesses. Of course, such persons can be called to testify if present at the
trial, whether voluntarily or by reason of a subpoena under Fed. R. Civ. P. 45. Arrangements may usually be made among counsel to have these persons present, if adequate notice
is given, at the requested time without the need for a subpoena or even if not subject to
subpoena. Sometimes, however, a party is unwilling to make available employees who are
beyond the subpoena powers of the court Despite the substantial interference with the
conduct of the trial it may cause, this declination appears to be permissible under current
rules if such persons will not be present during any part of the trial. In some circumstances,
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol25/iss3/3
however, courts have used their discretion under Fed. R. Evid. 611 to preclude parties who
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For instance, in DeFelicev. A.G. Edwards & Sons, 30 plaintiff-investors filed
suit in New Orleans against Edwards, a brokerage firm based in St. Louis that had
a branch office in New Orleans. The federal court in Louisiana granted the
through particular
motion to compel Edwards to testify in plaintiffs' case
3
Edwards' executives who lived and worked in St. Louis. '
In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,32 a tobacco products liability case, the
plaintiff sought to obtain the trial testimony of Dey, an officer of defendant-Liggett, a non-resident of New Jersey and not subject to the geographic subpoena
power of the court. Plaintiff "served" the witness through Liggett's registered
agent and Liggett's former parent corporation. 3 Dey was previously designated
as a Rule 30(b)(6) witness by Liggett and testified for three days. The court held
that the designation as a deposition witness does not constitute any waiver of an
objection to that witness' appearance at trial.' The court went on to rule that
the service on the registered agent and former parent was insufficient to compel
Dey's appearance at trial.35 Plaintiff then requested the opportunity to take a
new videotaped deposition of Dey.36 That request was denied -- because the
trial was in progress and no application was made earlier -- but it was noted that:
"The Court, however, in view of the defendant's refusal to produce Mr. Dey
voluntarily, has indicated that if he is not produced, the Court will consider
some adverse inference from the fact that he has not
permitting the jury
3 7 to draw
produced.
been
In re Nucorp Energy Securities Litigation38 is distinguishable. There, the
court ordered an officer of Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Securities Corp. ("DLJ")
to appear at trial even though he had not been served personally with a trial
subpoena. When DLJ decided not to bring the officer to testify, the trial judge
sanctioned DLJ by striking its answer and entering a default judgment.3 9 This
ruling may, however, have limited significance because the DLJ officer was, in

refuse to honor a reasonable request for production of a key witness subject to their control,
and thereby force an opponent to use a deposition, from calling the witness to testify personally during their presentation of evidence. (Footnotes omitted.)
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LrFIGATION SECOND § 22-23 (1985).
30 No.

82-4705 (E.D. La. 1982) (order granting motion to compel testimony).

31 Id.

32No. 83-2864(SA) (D.N.J. Jan. 27, 1988).
3'Transcript of Proceedings at 735, Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., No. 83-2864 (Feb. 3, 1988).
34

id.

35 Id.

36Id. at 747.
37Id. at 956.
Multidistrict Litigation 514 No. 87-6673 (S.D. Cal. 1987).
39 DLJ's

writ of mandamus to vacate the default was denied by the Ninth Circuit. Donaldson, Lutind &
Corp. v. United States
Jenrette Securities
Published
by IdeaExchange@UAkron,
1992 Dist Court for the S. Dist of Cal., No. 87-6673 (9th Cir. 1987)
(overruling writ of Mandamus).
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fact, a resident of California, and was amenable to service. Moreover, before the
court issued its order to produce the officer, DLJ had listed the employee as a
witness and told the court that it had control over and could produce the
prospective witness.'
Most courts have ruled that Rule 45(e)(1) applies to trial subpoenas

addressed to parties as well as to non-parties. These cases conclude that a party
cannot be required to appear at trial if it cannot be subpoenaed under Rule
45(e)(1). 41 In Steel, Inc. v. Atchinson, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Compa-

ny,42 certain shippers, for the most part located outside Kansas, sued a number
of railways in Kansas federal court. The defendants sought to compel plaintiffs'

representatives to testify at trial under former Rule 43(b), the predecessor of
Evidence Rule 611(c). The court declined to issue the requested subpoenas,
holding that Rule 43(b) did not itself establish any right to call an adverse party
as a witness, but only prescribed the manner of examination once an adverse
party was validly subpoenaed under Rule 45.43 The court did not expressly
consider whether the defendants could have compelled the corporate plaintiff itself
to testify through its officers, directors or managing agents.
Another possible argument is that federal courts have "inherent power" to
compel testimony by party representatives. There is no doubt that, in general,
district courts "have inherent powers, rooted in the chancellor's equity powers, 'to

process litigation to a just and equitable conclusion.'"44 The judiciary is "free,
within reason, to exercise this inherent judicial power in flexible and pragmatic

40

Transcript of Proceedings at 3746, In re Nucorp Energy Securities Litigation (S.D. Cal. 1987) (No. 876673). Cf. Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 206-07 (1958) (court's authority to dismiss
a complaint because of noncompliance with a discovery order derives from FED. R. Civ. P. 37 rather than
from "inherent power").
41See GFI Computer Indus., Inc. v. Fry, 476 F.2d 1, 5 (5th Cir. 1973) ("[t]he court had no power to force
a civil defendant outside its subpoena jurisdiction to appear personally at the trial and there submit to
examination"); Standard Metals Corp. v. Tomlin, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,644 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
(denying motion to compel attendance by defendants at trial, citing Fry); In re Champion Int'l Corp., No.
88-5050 (8th Cir. Feb. 10, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, Dist file) (granting petition for writ of
mandamus or prohibition; district court was without authority to direct Champion's C.E.O. and Senior
Vice President to travel from Connecticut to Minnesota to appear at trial). See also Wells v. Rushing,
755 F.2d 376, 380-81 n.5 (5th Cir. 1985) ("Of course, we do not hold that there is an absolute
requirement that a defendant in a civil case attend trial. Our reasoning is therefore consistent with that
in [Fry]").
In Hecht v. Don Mowry Flexo Parts, Inc., 111 F.R.D. 6, 11 (N.D. 111.1986), the court held that

a subpoena duces tecum issued to a corporate defendant located outside the court's Rule 45(e)(1)
subpoena power was invalid, because the Rule applied to parties as well as non-parties.
42 41 F.R.D. 337 (D. Kan. 1967).
"' "There is nothing in that rule [43(b)] which would imply a right of the examining party to require the
presence at trial of one not otherwise amenable to the subpoena provisions of [Rule 45]." Ia
44 HMG Property Investors, Inc. v. Parque Indus. Rio Canas, Inc., 847 F.2d 908, 915 (1st Cir. 1988)
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol25/iss3/3
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ways. '45 For example, federal courts have broad and inherent powers to stay
proceedings:
[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in
every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with
economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.
How this can best be done calls for the exercise of judgment, which
must weigh competing interests and maintain an even balance.4
This inherent power principle was applied in Brockton Savings Bank v. Peat,
Marwick, Mitchell & Co. There, the court held that a trial court has power to
enter a default judgment against a defendant who disobeyed the court's order to
bring two corporate officials who lived outside the court's subpoena power to a
hearing concerning the defendant's alleged fraud on the court.48 The First
Circuit observed that "[i]f one begins with the assumption that [the trial] court's
order ... is in reality a 'subpoena requiring the attendance of a witness at a
hearing or trial' pursuant to Rule 45, the cases... make clear that a court cannot
force the appearance at a hearing or trial of a witness beyond the court's
subpoena powers. ' ' 49
Nonetheless, the First Circuit found the trial court's
inherent powers sufficient to justify the order. The court reasoned that "the rules
of civil procedure do not completely describe and limit the power of district
courts...."00

Other courts reject this approach. One state court clearly held that "[iun civil
proceedings the court has no inherent power to order the physical presence of a
litigant other than as a witness." 5' In Strandell v. Jackson County,52 the court
acknowledged that "a district court no doubt has substantial inherent power to
control and manage its docket."5 3 However, in holding that the district court
lacked the power to compel litigants to participate in a summary jury trial,' the
Seventh Circuit pointed out:
That [inherent] power must, of course, be exercised in a manner that
is in harmony with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Those rules
4sId. at 916.

'Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1936).
47 771 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1018 (1986).
43

49

Id. at 12.
Id. at 10.

Sld. at II.

the trial court
had no power to compel a person's attendance as a witness, it had no power to compel his attendance at
trial as a party).
32 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1987).
S3 Id. at 886 (citations omitted).
' See generally Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute Resolution:
Published
by IdeaExchange@UAkron,
Some Cautionary
Observations, 53 1992
U. CHt L REv. 366, 386 (1986).
sI Armstrong v. Hooker, 135 Ariz 358, 360, 661 P.2d 208, 210 (Ariz. App. 1982) (since
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are the product of a careful process of study and reflection designed to
take "due cognizance both of the need for expedition of cases and the
protection of individual rights." S. Rep. No. 1744, 85th Cong., 2d
Sess., reprintedin 1958 U.S. Code Cong. & Adnin. News 3023, 3026.
That process ... also reflects the joint responsibility of the legislative
and judicial branches of government in striking the delicate balance
between these competing concerns.... Therefore, in those areas of
trial practice where the Supreme Court and the Congress, acting
together, have addressed the appropriate balance between the needs for
judicial efficiency and the rights of the individual litigant, innovation
by the individual judicial officer must conform to that balance."
In other words, district courts may not override
56 express provisions of the Federal
Rules using the rubric of "inherent powers.
In most cases, therefore, a litigant cannot be assured that officials of a
corporate party will be compelled to testify if they reside beyond the court's
power to subpoena them as individuals. There are, however, strategies available
that may provide at least some relief from a negative result.
ALTERNATIVES TO OBTAIN TRIAL TESTIMONY

Currently, there are ways to solve or minimize the problem of securing
testimony from a corporate opponent's personnel. As will be seen, none is fully
satisfactory. The major disadvantage is that each requires counsel to anticipate
the problem at a relatively early stage in the litigation and to act on that
knowledge. The failure to do so may mean that relevant testimony is unobtainable at trial.
File the Action Where the Defendant's Employees Are Located
A plaintiff could always file her action in a district where she believes the
relevant personnel from the defendant corporation are amenable to that court's
subpoena power. But this may be an impractical solution. First, the plaintiff may
be forced to sue in a locale far from her residence, thereby aggravating the burden
and expense of litigating. It may also give the defendant a "home town"
advantage -- a factor that could be of particular importance in jury trials. Second,
at least in complex litigation, a plaintiff rarely will be in a position prior to filing
the complaint of knowing with certainty which of the defendant's personnel
should be called in the affirmative case at trial. Generally, discovery is first
necessary. Third, if the defendant has several business locations, there may be
no single court
that would have subpoena power over all the personnel to be
57
called at trial.
5 838 F.2d at 886-87 (citations omitted).
56 Cf. Societe

Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 206-07 (1958).

5 See supra note 2 (quoting venue statute).
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol25/iss3/3
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Consequently, the ability to subpoena important witnesses for trial should be
considered before the lawsuit is filed. But, as indicated, this problem can not be
satisfactorily resolved at this stage.
Use Depositions as the Alternative to Live Testimony
Another potential solution is to depose the corporate executives and then
read the transcripts (or show the videotaped deposition 5 ) at trial.59 A federal

court will, upon application, issue a subpoena to any person located in the court's
jurisdiction for a discovery deposition in that jurisdiction.
relatively straightforward:

The procedure is

Rule 45(d)(1) provides that service of notice to take a deposition, as
required to be given to all other parties by Rules 30(b) and 31(a),
constitutes sufficient authorization "for the issuance by the clerk of the
district court for the district in which the deposition is to be taken of
subpoenas" including provisions for the inspection and copying of
designated documents. The scheme of Rule 45 therefore permits a
litigant to obtain a deposition subpoena in any district court of the
United States regardless of where the principal litigation is pending, a
discovery opportunity well established.... The only express limitations on nationwide discovery via deposition are that, first, the deposition must be taken in the district of the issuing court, and second, a

See Mark IV Properties, Inc. v. Club Development & Mgt. Corp., 12 Bankr. 854 (Bankr. S.D. Cal.
1981) (discussing use of videotaped depositions in bench trial); FED. R. Cir. P. 30(b)(4) ("The parties may
stipulate in writing or the court may upon motion order that the testimony at a deposition be recorded by
other than stenographic means. The stipulation or order shall designate the person before whom the
deposition shall be taken, the manner of recording, preserving and filing the deposition and may include
other provisions to assure that the recorded testimony will be accurate and trustworthy.").
59 FED. R. Civ. P. 32(a) provides in part:
At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding, any part or all
of a deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence applied as though the
witness were then present and testifying, may be used against any party who was present
or represented at the taking of the deposition or who had reasonable notice thereof, in
accordance with any of the following provisions:
(2) The deposition of a party or of anyone who, at the time of taking the deposition
was an officer, director, or managing agent, or a person designated under Rule 30(b)(6)
or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a public or private corporation, partnership or association
or governmental agency which is a party may be used by an adverse party for any purpose.
(3) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for
any purpose if the court finds: (A) that the witness is dead; or (B) that the witness is
at a greater distance than 100 miles from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the
United States, unless it appears that the absence of the witness was procured by the
party offering the deposition; or (C) that the witness is unable to attend or testify
because of age, illness, infirmity, or imprisonment; or (D) that the party offering the
deposition has been unable to procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena; or (E)
upon application and notice, that such exceptional circumstances exist as to make it
desirable, in the interest of justice and with due regard to the importance of presenting
orally in open court, to allow the deposition to be used.
testimony of witnesses
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witness may only be compelled to attend a deposition within the

geographic constraints of 45(d)(2). 60

But this approach has practical problems. It is often difficult to convey to
jurors, through the reading of a deposition, aspects of the witness' demeanor that
may be critical. "There is a strong preference for live testimony, long recognized
by the courts, as it provides the trier of fact the opportunity to observe the
demeanor of the witness. As Judge Learned Hand stated, '[t]he deposition has

always been, and stil' ! , treated as a substitute, a second-best, not to be used

when the original is at hand."' 61 Moreover, while reading excerpts from
depositions may be more efficient than live direct and cross examination, it can
bore a jury quickly. "Depositions, deadening and one-sided, are a poor substitute
for live testimony especially where vital issues of fact may hinge on credibili-

ty."'

A deposition taken early in the litigation may not cover all the issues that

emerge as important for trial. Likewise, the examiner may not have had the
benefit of information which was discovered later in the proceeding which could

have broadened or sharpened the questioning.
Move to Transfer the Case
From the defendant's perspective, moving for transfer under 28 U.S.C. §
1404(a) might be one way to help ensure access to a plaintiff corporation's outof-district witnesses. 63 That section provides that "[flor the convenience of

60 In re Guthrie, 733 F.2d 634, 638 (4th Cir. 1984) (citations omitted) (subpoena was properly quashed
when service was made outside the state and beyond the 100 miles).

In Nippondenso Co., Ltd. v. Denso Distributors, No. 86-3982 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 21, 1987)(LEXlS,
Genfed Library, Dist file), the court ordered plaintiff to produce for deposition Mr. Totani, a retired
executive, but who had a continuing connection to the plaintiff corporation. "[Bly reason of Mr. Totani's
former and continuing association with corporate entities over which plaintiff has majority controlling
interests, plaintiff clearly has the power to produce Mr. Totani in this district for his deposition." let at
8553.
51United States v. Int'l Business Machines Corp., 90 F.R.D. 377, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), quoting Napier
v. Bossard, 102 F.2d 467, 469 (2d Cir. 1939). See, e.g., Bally Manufacturing Corp. v. Kane, 698 F. Supp.
734, 739 (N.D. Ill. 1988) ("The live testimony of material non-party witnesses is preferred."); San Shoe
Trading Corp. v. Converse Inc., 649 F. Supp. 341, 347 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("live witnesses are preferred to
the deposition testimony that can be used in their absence"); Walter E. Heller & Co. v. James Godbe Co.,
601 F. Supp. 319, 322 (N.D. Ill. 1984) ("use of depositions would not be an adequate substitute for live
testimony where credibility of the witnesses is important"); Hotel Constructors, Inc. v. Seagrave Corp.,
543 F. Supp. 1048, 1051 (N.D. Ill. 1982) ("It is well settled that the trier of fact should not be forced to
rely on deposition evidence when the deponent's live testimony can be procured.").
62 Polaroid Corp. v. Casselman, 213 F. Supp. 379, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
63 Federal law also provides for transfer and consolidation of multidistrict litigation:

When civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact are pending in different districts, such actions may be transferred to any district for coordinated or
consolidated pretrial proceedings. Such transfers shall be made by the judicial panel on
multidistrict litigation authorized by this section upon its determination that transfers for
such proceedings will be for the convenience of parties and witnesses and will promote the
just and efficient conduct of such actions.
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parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any
civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought."
a plaintiff's choice of forum is entitled to considerable
While "[g]enerally
'
weight,"t6
in deciding whether the convenience of the witnesses justifies transfer
under § 1404(a), the court also should consider whether the potential
witnesses can65be compelled to testify in either the transferor or transferee district.
Brant Point involved a zoning application for property in North Carolina,
brought in Massachusetts by a Massachusetts corporation against individuals
residing in North Carolina. On a motion to transfer, the court noted that it would
be unlikely that many witnesses in North Carolina would be subject to subpoena
by the Massachusetts district court.
[A] trial in Massachusetts would consist substantially of the reading of
deposition transcripts .... [S]uch a result is unacceptable when the
action can be transferred to a district where attendance can be compelled and live testimony can be presented to the jury.6
The case was transferred to the Western District of North Carolina.
In Anchor Savings Bank,67 the court transferred the case to another district
more convenient for the majority of witnesses with first-hand knowledge.6 The
court listed some relevant considerations for transfer as including "convenience
of parties and witnesses; the relative ease of access to evidence, availability of
compulsory process, and cost of obtaining witnesses; where the case may be tried
most efficiently and expeditiously; and the interests of justice. ....69
In another case, Judge Pollak granted a motion to transfer where:
The potential difficulty in tryng plaintiff's suite here is compounded,
however, by the fact that the court could not compel the attendance of
28 U.S.C. § 1407(a). See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster at John F. Kennedy Int'l Airport of June 24,
1975, 407 F. Supp. 244 (J.P.M.D.L. 1976) (multiple actions transferred under § 1407(a) to the Eastern
District of New York, the district in which the crash occurred and where most of the key witnesses were
located).
Anchor Savings Bank v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 634 F. Supp. 398, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
Brant Point Corp. v. Poetzsch, 671 F. Supp. 2, 4 (D. Mass. 1987).
"Id. at 5.
6 634 F. Supp. 398 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
The court wrote: "Since it appears that trial of this case in the Western District would be more
convenient for the great majority of witnesses with firsthand knowledge, and since that district has
considerably more connection with the operative facts than this district, it is in the interest of justice to
transfer the action there for trial." Id. at 401.
Published
by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1992
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witnesses or the production of documents under the subpoena power
given under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Even minor disputes
between the parties during discovery would be aggravated not only by
geography, but by the court's inability under the Federal Rules to
compel appropriate trial preparation should the need arise.70
Conrail claimed in part that the case should be transferred to the district where
the accident at issue occurred because witnesses -- including its own employees -would be outside the subpoena power of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.71
Similarly, in Jadair,Inc. v. Van Lott,Inc.,72 the court recognized that "[a]
plaintiff by its choice of forum should not be permitted to force its opponent to
try a case by deposition. 7' 3 The court went on to explain that "in considering
the factor of witnesses not subject to the court's subpoena power, the court must
evaluate014which of the witnesses will have material and significant testimony....
Another illustration of a trial court's use of the transfer device to obtain live
testimony of witnesses is found in Moore v. Velsicol Chemical Corp. 5 In that
wrongful death diversity case, the plaintiff alleged that the decedent contracted
cancer as a result of exposure to chemical pesticides manufactured by the
defendant.76 Both the plaintiff and decedent were Connecticut residents, and
plaintiff sought to establish liability under Connecticut statutory product liability
law." Defendant was an Illinois resident. The defendant moved to transfer the
case to Connecticut arguing, among other things, that "transfer would increase the
accessibility of witnesses and documentary proof. .. 7.8 The court agreed and
granted the motion, writing that:
[T]he Court believes that transfer of this case would better enable the
parties to obtain deposition testimony and adduce more live testimony
at trial than would be the case if the action remained in this district.
It is clear that many witnesses significant to the defendant's case --

70

Walker v. Consolidated Rail Corp., No. 87-4624 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 13, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed Library,

Dist file).
" Id. Slip op. at 2.
7

512 F. Supp. 1141 (E.D. Wis. 1981).

7Id. at 1145.
14 Id.
7 No. 80-C0450 (N.D. 11. June 18, 1980) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
16 Id. Slip op. at 2.
7 id.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol25/iss3/3
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prescribing and treating physicians of the deceased, his co-workers, and
fellow members of the trade association to which he belonged -- are
more likely to be found in Connecticut than in this district.79
Hotel Constructors80 similarly ordered transfer, in part based on "the
primary concern of insuring whenever possible the live presence of these material
non-party witnesses." 81 The Supreme Court seems to approve of this approach.
In a forum non conveniens case, the Court wrote:
Certainly to fix the place of trial at a point where litigants cannot
compel personal attendance and may be forced to try their cases on
deposition, is to create a condition not satisfactory to court, jury or
most litigants. Nor is it necessarily cured by the statement of plaintiff's counsel that he will see to getting many of the witnesses to the
trial and that some of them "would be delighted to come to New York
to testify." There may be circumstances where such a proposal should
be given weight. In others, the offer may not turn out to be as generous as defendant or court might suppose it to be. Such matters2 are for
the District Court to decide in exercise of a sound discretion.8
The Court ruled that the District Court for the Southern District of New York did
not exceed its discretion in dismissing the case.83
Thus, if a defendant needs the live testimony of important witnesses subject
to another court's subpoena power, the defendant should consider moving for
transfer. There is one cautionary note: transfer in order to obtain access to
testimony by one party may, of course, hinder the ability of the other party to
obtain testimony from officers of the defendant or others. From the plaintiff's
perspective, transfer should be denied where it would result in the loss of ability
to compel final attendance of witnesses.
The case of Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National
Football League8 was an antitrust action arising out of the proposed move of
the Oakland Raiders football team to Los Angeles. The NFL moved for transfer,
In
essentially based on grounds of juror prejudice and pretrial publicity."

71 Id. Slip op. at 4. The court noted that the parties conceded that relevant documents could be secured
regardless of where the case is tried.
so 543 F. Supp. 1048, 1052 (N.D. MI1982).
8IId.

at 1051. See also Walter E. Heller & Co. v. James Godbe Co., 601 F. Supp. 319, 322 (N.D. 111.

1984) ("unavailability of... material non-party witnesses weighs heavily in favor of transfer").
82 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 511 (1947).
83

"

Id.
89 F.R.D. 497 (C.D. Cal. 1981).
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assessing the convenience of witnesses, termed "the most important factor in
passing on a transfer motion,"" "courts consider the effect of a transfer on the
availability of certain witnesses, and their live testimony at trial."87 Thus,
transfer may be denied where witnesses reside in the forum district or are within
that court's subpoena power.8 Many of the plaintiff's and defendants' witnesses
were located in the Central District of California. The NFL did not contend that
a transfer was necessary for the convenience of any of its witnesses. This factor
provided "additional support" for denial of their transfer motion.89
A similar situation was created by transfer in Moore,90 but the court did not
regard the problem in that case as being significant:
[P]laintiff contends that corporate witnesses essential to her case are
likely to be found within this district. If the action remains in this Court,
defendant would not be able to compel by subpoena either the discovery
of the Connecticut witnesses or their appearance and testimony at trial.
If, however, the case is transferred to Connecticut, defendant obviously
would be able to compel the live testimony of many of those witnesses.
Conversely, although plaintiff might not be able to compel the live
testimony of defendant's corporate officers, it will be able to compel by
subpoena the deposition testimony of these witnesses. 9
The court based its reasoning on the fact that without the Connecticut witnesses,
the defendant chemical company would be unable to establish its defense of lack
of causation, while the plaintiff could prove the facts it needed from deposition
testimony and documentary evidence.' Obviously, such a rationale seems to
favor the defense and may prove to be highly inequitable to the party unable to
use live witnesses at trial.
The court attempted to solve this dilemma in A.P.T., Inc. v. Quad Environmental Technologies Corp.93 The court first noted that some witnesses -"principals" of parties to the suit -- would be outside the subpoena power of the
court to which the case would be transferred. 9 It thus granted defendant's
transfer motion, but conditioned transfer on the defendant's willingness to "make
86Id.
87

at 501.

id.

88Id.
89Id.

9oSee supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
91Moore v. Velsicol Chemical Corp., No. 80-C0450 (N.D. M1. June 18, 1980) (LEXIS, Genfed library,

Dist file).
92Id.
93

698 F. Supp. 718 (N.D. Il. 1988).
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available for trial in California those of its employees
who [plaintiff] reasonably
95
believes are necessary to prosecute its claims.
In sum, then, each of these alternative tactics 96 has shortcomings. What is
needed is a clear path that solves the problem directly.
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
The path to solving the problems highlighted in the previous section should
come via an amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It is a fact of
business life that most corporate officials who fall into the officer/director/managing agent category travel widely and frequently. Consequently, none of the
suggested revisions should place undue hardship on corporations or their
personnel.
Require A Corporate Defendant to Produce Its Officials at Trial
The most straightforward amendment would be a blanket rule requiring
corporate parties to produce key officials at trial or risk entry of an adverse
judgment. Washington State has adopted this approach. Its rule provides that:
A party, or anyone who at the time of the notice is an officer, director,
or other managing agent (herein collectively referred to as "managing
agent") of a public or private corporation, partnership or association
which is a party to an action or proceeding may be examined at the
instance of any adverse party. Attendance of such deponent or witness
may be compelled solely by notice (in lieu of a subpoena) given in the
manner prescribed in Rule 30(a) to opposing counsel of record. Notices
for the attendance of a party or of a managing agent at the trial shall be
given not less than 10 days before.... [Flor good cause... the court
may make orders for the protection of the party or managing agent to be
examined."

95 Id.
See supra notes 55-95 and accompanying text.
Another alternative may also be available for use in a very limited class of cases. "Director Service
Statutes" provide that a director of a corporation implicitly consents to the appointment of the

corporation's registered agent as his or her agent for service of process in any action involving the
corporation where the director is a necessary or proper party or for violation of a duty owed to the
corporation. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit 10, § 3114 (1991).
The Delaware Supreme Court has ruled that a non-Delaware resident whose only contact with the
state is the acceptance of a Delaware corporate directorship has sufficient contacts with the state to be
subject to its jurisdiction. Armstrong v. Pomerance, 432 A.2d 174 (Del. 1980). The statute is limited to

a cause of action implicating acts performed in their capacity as directors. See Hana Ranch, Inc. v. Lent
424 A.2d 28 (Del.Ch. 1980).
97WASH. by
CIV.
R. 43(0(1).
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If the requested executives fail to appear, a judgment against the non-complying
party can be entered. 98

California law is similar: An officer, director, or managing agent of a party
or person need not be served with a subpoena as long as written notice requesting
the witness to appear is served on counsel for the party.99
In Campbell v. A.H. Robins Co.,10 a Dalkon Shield case, the plaintiff sued
A.H. Robins, a Virginia corporation, in Washington State court. Under Rule
43(f)(1), the plaintiff served a notice on Robins requesting the presence at trial
of 12 Robins' agents who resided outside Washington. The appellate court held
that the notice was proper because the plaintiff "did not ask the trial court to
compel the attendance of a nonresident witness or to issue a subpoena for service
outside Washington. Rather, the notice was addressed to Robins, a party,
requesting the appearance of certain of its managing agents at trial."'0 1 The
court stressed that the plaintiff had a right to call Robins as an adverse party, but

further, that sanctions for noncompliance could run against Robins only.1 2 The

decision pointed to "the power of the court over the parties to the action, and the

WASH. Civ. R. 43(f)(3).
9In the case of the production of a party to the record of any civil action or proceeding or of a person
for whose immediate benefit an action or proceeding is prosecuted or defended or of anyone who is an
officer, director, or managing agent of any such party or person, the service of a subpoena upon any such
witness is not required if written notice requesting the witness to attend before a court, or at a trial of an
issue therein, with the time and place thereof, is served upon the attorney of that party or person. The
notice shall be served at least 10 days before the time required for attendance unless the court prescribes
a shorter time. If entitled thereto, the witness, upon demand, shall have paid witness fees and mileage
before being required to testify. The giving of the notice shall have the same effect as service of a
subpoena on the witness, and the parties shall have such rights and the court may make such orders,
including the imposition of sanctions, as in the case of a subpoena for attendance before the court.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1987(b) (West 1991). In addition, subsection (c) provides:
If the notice specified in subdivision (b) is served at least 20 days before the time required for
attendance, or within such shorter time as the court may order, it may include a request that
the party or person bring with him or her books, documents or other things. The notice shall
state the exact materials or things desired and that the party or person has them in his or her
possession or under his or her control. Within five days thereafter, or such other period as the
court may allow, the party or person of whom the request is made may serve written objections
to the request or any part thereof, with a statement of grounds. Thereafter, upon noticed
motion of the requesting party, accompanied by a showing of good cause and of materiality
of the items to the issues, the court may order production of items to which objection was
made, unless the objecting party or person establishes good cause for nonproduction or production under limitations or conditions.
'00 32 Wash. App. 98, 645 P.2d 1138 (1982).
'0' Id. at 1140.
'02 "The rule authorizes the court in its discretion to levy sanctions against the employer, Robins, if its

managing agents fail to appear. CR 43(0(3). The rule avoids the limitations of the subpoena power by
18
to comply with the notice." Id.
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expectation that a party faced with sanctions will exercise its own power over its
managing agents.""1 3
This direction has the obvious benefit of providing a black letter rule for
corporate parties. Parties will know, in advance, that witnesses' testimony can be
compelled. A substantial body of law already exists about whether particular
individuals are "managing agents."'0 4 Moreover, the court would have the
express authority to issue a protective order in appropriate cases.
This change could be universally accomplished by amending Rule 45(e) to
track the Washington rule quoted above' 05 (with appropriate modifications).
However, a majority of the Federal Courts Committee of the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York rejected such an approach.1 6 The Committee
Report noted that:
[R]egardless of whether the 100-mile rule makes sense in terms of its
original rationale, there is no reason to change it unless it is causing
problems today, and those problems have not been demonstrated. It does
mean that some witnesses appear by deposition rather than in person, but
we do not think that this concern justifies abolishing the 100-mile limit.
The rule does permit a lawyer in a trial setting who controls a distant
witness to force his adversary to rely on deposition testimony, while the
lawyer retains the advantage of deciding whether to produce the witness
to testify live during the lawyer's own case. This asserted problem is
certainly mitigated by the availability of video-taped depositions.
Moreover, all procedural rules harbor nooks and crannies of advantage
and disadvantage, and we do not think that this one creates a consistent
or systematic imbalance that would justify a rule change, particularly in
view of the inconvenience and problems caused by case-by-case
adjudication of whether individual witnesses can be called to testify."°

"3 Id. at 1143. Moreover, because the attendance of managing agents of a party may be "compelled" by
sanctions against the party itself, who is already subject to the jurisdiction of the court, any potential due
process problem is avoided. Id.
' Who is a "managing agent" in a corporation requires a case-by-case determination. The Eighth Circuit
ruled that "an individual is a 'managing agent' if: (1) His interests in the litigation are identified with his
principal, and (2) he acts with superior authority and general autonomy, being invested with broad powers
to exercise his discretion with regard to the subject matter of the litigation." Skogen v. Dow Chemical Co.,
375 F.2d 692, 701 (8th Cir. 1967) (district court's finding that two scientists were not managing agents
was erroneous, but harmless error); see also Krauss v. Erie Ry. Co., 16 F.R.D. 126, 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1954)
("A managing agent, as distinguished from one who is merely 'an employee,' is a person invested by the
corporation with general powers to exercise his judgment and discretion in dealing with corporate matters;
he does not act 'in an inferior capacity' under close supervision or direction of 'superior authority'"), Iti

"5 See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
10 Report on Proposed Changes to Rule 45(eX1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Feb. 17, 1989).
"o Id. at by
10-11.
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Instead, the Committee concluded that there should be no change in the current
structure of Rule 45 regarding witnesses controlled by a party. "[The disadvantage of being compelled to rely on deposition testimony at trial, particularly

given the availability of video-taped depositions, does not justify the increased
inconvenience to witnesses, and increased expense and complexity of litigation,

that would be entailed by authorizing nationwide service on a case by case
basis.'
It seems that the
)mmittee did not adequately consider that videotaped
depositions are more expensive and may be more time consuming for the court
in having to rule on objections. At least one court has found videotaped
testimony wanting where the testimony was of a key witness and credibility was
at issue. 10 9 A systematic, easy to apply, general rule seems far preferable." 0
Revised Rule 30(b)(6)
A second approach would be to broaden Rule 45 to incorporate a provision
modeled on Rule 30(b)(6), which applies to depositions."' That rule now
provides that a party may serve a deposition notice on a corporation (the rule also
applies to partnerships, associations, and other entities) describing the matters on
which examination is requested. The noticed entity must then designate knowledgeable officers, directors, managing agents, or other persons to give testimony
on the requested subjects."'
Under Rule 30(b)(6), a party "must make a
conscientious good-faith endeavor to designate the persons having knowledge of
the matters sought ...and to prepare those persons in order that they can answer
"' Id. at 11-12.
'0' Paul v. Int'l Precious Metals Corp., 613 F. Supp. 174 (S.D. Miss. 1985), involved tort, fiduciary duty,

and federal commodities law claims concerning contracts for the purchase of precious metals. The
plaintiff resided and brought suit in Mississippi. The defendant corporation was located in Florida and
it successfully moved to transfer the case to that state's Southern District under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The
court wrote that:
mhe key witness in the Plaintiffs fraud action against the Defendant is ... no longer
... employed by the Defendant and is not subject to subpoena should this action be tried
in the Southern District of Mississippi. In view of the importance of this testimony and
the credibility determinations to be made based upon it, the Plaintiff's suggestion that his
testimony be presented through videotaped deposition is particularly unappealing.
Id. at 179. See also supra note 58.
0
" The Committee Rept . noted (at 1, n.1) that the Federal Court Committee of the New York State Bar
Association took a contrary position and endorsed a rule authorizing district courts to compel testimony
by party-employee witnesses.
.. In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., No. 83-2864(SA), the plaintiff argued that it could compel the
attendance at trial of a deposition witness designated by Liggett under Rule 30(b)(6). The district court
disagreed. "Nothing in Rule 30(b)(6) permits plaintiff to compel the appearance at trial of a witness
outside of the Court's subpoena power granted by [Rule] 45(e)(i).... The rule neither states nor implies
that such designation also amounts to a waiver of any objection to that witness' appearance at trial."
Transcript, at 73 (Feb. 2, 1988).
112 FED. R. CIv. P. 30(b)(6).
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol25/iss3/3
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unevasively, the questions posed... as to the relevant subject
fully, completely,
11 3
matters.

Rule 45 could be amended to apply Rule 30(b)(6) deposition procedures to

trials. A party could then serve a notice requiring a corporate opponent to
designate as trial witnesses persons knowledgeable about specifically described

subjects. The effect of the Rule change would be to allow a party to obtain
testimony from knowledgeable persons employed by the adverse corporation, but
not subject as individuals to the subpoena power of the forum court, and obtain
sanctions against that adverse party -- not the individuals -- for noncompliance

with the request. An additional benefit is that the testimony of the persons
designated pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6) "is the testimony of the corporation and, if
the corporation is a party, the testimony may be used at trial by an adverse party
for any purpose." ' 4
In fact, a variant of this proposal has already been used. In In re Washington
Public Power Supply System Litigation,1 5 the court required testimony of
witnesses beyond the subpoena power of the District Court to be transmitted to
the courtroom live
by satellite. The testimony would be compelled by the
6
deposition rules."
Nonetheless, this solution has flaws. A requesting party will have to carefully

craft its notice to obtain the witnesses it wants.

But that may not be an

insurmountable difficulty at trial, particularly if discovery has narrowed down the

113Mitsui

& Co. (U.S.A.), Inc. v. P.R. Water Resources Auth., 93 F.R.D. 62, 67 (D.P.R. 1981).

"' GTE Products Corp. v. Gee, 115 F.R.D. 67, 68 (D. Mass. 1987). See also Lapenna v. Upjohn Co.,

110 F.R.D. 15, 20 (E.D. Pa. 1986) ("When a corporation produces an employee pursuant to a Fed. R. Civ.
P. 30(b)(6) notice, it represents that the employee has the authority to speak on behalf of the corporation
with respect to the areas within the notice of deposition. This extends not only to facts but also to
subjective beliefs and opinions."). Id.
ns M.D.L No. 551, unpublished order (D. Ariz. Aug. 9, 1988).
6
d. See generally Note, Clever Tool or Dirty Pool?: WPPSS, Closed Circuit Testimony and the Rule

45(e) Subpoena Power, 21 ARIz. ST. LJ. 275 (1989).
Live testimony by satellite was also permitted in In re San Juan DuPont Plaza Hotel Fire Litigation,
129 F.R.D. 424 (D.P.R. 1989). Judge Acosta rationalized that:
The Court has little doubt that the presentation of live testimony by satellite is a viable, and
even refreshing, alternative to the deadening recitation of numerous depositions. It also would
be most helpful to the jury in the fulfillment of their sworn duties. After all, the purpose of
trial is precisely to ensure the truth-seeking process which, to a great extent, is based on the
demeanor of witnesses. In addition, the use of satellite transmitted testimony avoids the
burdens and problems inherent in the arranging of travel schedules, conflicting obligations, and
extended stays in the transferee district because of the uncertainties of trial schedules.
Id. at 425-26. The court adopted a "protocol" for the use of satellite transmitted testimony that could be

Published
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a model for
other courts. Id. at 427-30.
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However, the examination would be confined to matters

stated "with reasonable particularity" in the deposition notice."'

As a result,

counsel would have to pay serious attention to that deposition notice, to ensure
that she gets the right witness before the court at trial, and able to obtain
testimony in the desired areas.
Provide the Trial Court With Discretion to Require Attendance at Trial
The third approach would be to give trial courts discretion to require

corporate parties to make their officers, directors and managing agents (who as
individuals are outside the subpoena power) available for examination at trial
upon a showing of need. The showing could include a demonstration why
presenting deposition testimony would be an inadequate alternative and the
importance of the witness's testimony. On the other side of the balance could be
the burden to the corporate party and the witness.
This amendment would require corporations to produce personnel located
outside the court's venue at trial, but would protect them from undue burden and
expense. However, additional effort would be required by the adverse party and
the court. 19
CONCLUSION

A common sense approach is needed to solve the very real problems at trial
created under the current Federal Rules. The Supreme Court should recognize
that, with much of the high stakes 2 ° federal court litigation involving multistate and multi-national enterprises, artificial limitations on the ability to compel
trial testimony of persons controlled by corporate parties is irrational. Business
is often done on a national and world-wide basis, and executives think nothing
of long distance air travel.'
Moreover, nation-wide subpoena power is

Indeed, "[tihe problem of identifying an opponent corporation's spokesman on a particular point has
been greatly diminished with the adoption of Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6), which in effect places the onus for
identification on the corporation." Lapenna, 110 F.R.D. at 20.
118 Paparelli v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 108 F.R.D. 727, 730 (D. Mass. 1985).
"17

This proposal could be implemented by adding to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure a new section
to Rule 45:
"9

If the subpoena is for the attendance of a director, officer, or managing agent of a corporation
and such person does not reside within the district or within 100 miles of the place of the
hearing or trial, then the party filing the notice must show good cause why such person should
appear at the hearing or trial. For good cause shown, the district court may, in its discretion,
require the corporation to produce such person at the trial or hearing.
'20 For example, under the 1988 amendments to Title 28, diversity jurisdiction exists only where the
matter in controversy exceeds $50,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1988). It is also more difficult to remove
a case based on diversity jurisdiction. Id. § 1446.
'2' See Bucklo, supra note 4, at 54 ("The breadth of the courts' subpoena powers has not caught up with

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol25/iss3/3
modern air travel. .. ").
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available in federal criminal cases. 12
remedy this situation in civil cases.

593

The Court should amend the Rules to

requiring the attendance of a witness at a hearing or trial
may be served at any place within the United States.").

subpoena
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